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Aristotle’s Demarcation of Senses of Energeia 
in Metaphysics. IX,6
Aristotle’s distinction between energeia and kinesis has 
received renewed interest since Gilbert Ryle employed it in his 
discussion of perception. (1) Ryle suggested we misunderstand 
perceptual activities, such as seeing and hearing when we consider 
them processes or states which have the sorts of causes typical 
of those. Instead, he proposed we should follow Aristotle and 
recognize, from attention to grammar, that "the verbs ’see’ and 
’hear* function like the verb ’win”* or other "verbs of starting 
and stopping" (for example, ’find,’ ’begin,’ or ’arrive') rather 
than like verbs for processes or states. The response to Ryle's 
utilization of Aristotle's distinction between energeia and 
kinesis has become a fairly sizable literature.(2} Because there 
still seems to be some confusion as to how Aristotle is to be 
understood, and because the distinction between energeia and 
kinesis plays such a crucial role in many important contexts,(3) 
a réévaluation of Aristotle’s concepts seems warranted.
When interpreters have followed Ryle in viewing Aristotle 
as distinguishing different sorts of verbs, they have run into 
problems. Aristotle’s indication in Meta-physics IX,6 that in 
the case of energeiai "we are seeing and have seen, are understan­
ding and have understood, are thinking and have thought," whereas 
we cannot thus conjoin present and perfect tenses in the case of 
kineseis, since we use the perfect tense with them only when they 
are complete and terminated, is taken by John Ackrill as 
Aristotle’s criterion for distinguishing energeiai and kineseis.(4)
The problem, then, when the ability to conjoin present and perfect 
tenses is made the criterion for energeiai. is that many presumed 
energeiai fail to meet it, though presumecC kineseis may. Aristotle 
seems to want such activities as hearing and enjoying to be 
energeiai-, but if we consider the hearing or enjoying of a 
symphony, we quickly recognize that it is improper to say I am 
hearing or enjoying a , symphony and I have heard or enjoyed the 
symphony. The perfect tense seems proper only when the symphony 
is already through, but subsequent to the symphony, of course, we 
should not use the present tense about our hearing it or enjoying 
it. Conversely, when kineseis are considered without reference 
to their ends, for example, walking or building taken apart from 
any place to which we walk or any structure arising from the 
building, then it seems proper at any moment at which we are 
walking or building to say that we have already walked and built. 
Hence, these supposed kineseis appear to be energeiai by the 
linguistic criterion.(5) In order to overcome this difficulty 
for Aristotle’s distinction, some interpreters have proposed that 
we not view him as depending upon this linguistic criterion, 
but as having another way to grasp the distinction.(6) What I 
shall try to contribute to this line of approach is a somewhat 
closer treatment of Aristotle's discussion in Metaphysics IX,6 
than has been previously attempted and a broader reflection upon 
its significance.
Aristotle clearly indicates in Metaphysics IX,6 that energeia 
cannot be defined, but that it must be apprehended by induction 
from analogy (1048a35-7).(7) We must therefore appreciate the 
possibility that Aristotle aims not so much for a precise formula­
tion of what energeia is, but the supply of hints to facilitate 
our understanding! In the course of presenting the analogy,
Aristotle evidently distinguishes two senses of energeia. He 
states, "But all things are not said in the same sense to exist 
actually, but only by analogy— as A is in B or to B, Ö is in D or 
to D; for some are as movement (kinesis) to potency, and the 
others as substance (ousia) to some sort of matter (I048b6-9).M 
Aristotle offers little discussion here of these two main kinds 
of energeiai. but we may utilize other sections of Metaphysics IX 
to fill in the line of thought-to prepare us for the subtler 
distinction he goes on to make between kinesis and energeia.
The first sort of energeia noted in the passage is motion.
This most obvious sort of energeia is declared in a previous 
section to be the prominent type. Aristotle asserts,
The name ’ energeia. ' which extends all/the way to complete 
reality ( t τήν νυνγ10€/-(ενη), derives, even in
other cases, especially from motions; for energeia seems
^2. V
2especially to be motion, on account of which motion is not 
attributed to things which are not, though some other predica­
tions are, for instance things which are not are thinkable and 
desirable, but are not moving, and this is because not being 
in actuality they will be in actuality (οΰκ οντ<* év^ayeíf 
«σοντ«(ΐ evc^yeía). Por of things which are not some are in 
potentiality, but are not since they are not in complete 
reality («ντ€λ£χ£ΐ$— 1047a30-b2). (8)
We can certainly conclude that Aristotle believes motion to be 
energeia and even the most evident kind. In this passage he 
emphasizes the fact that only things that actually are can undergo 
the further actualization involved in moving. Motion is the 
actualization of something’s potentiality to be in motion. Hence, 
when in the passage in Metaphysics IX,6 Aristotle says that some 
energeiai "are as movement to potency (104Sb8)," he has in mind 
motion’s correlation with dunanis of the sort he has already 
claimed to be the "strictest" type (/u«X(ö*Tec Kij/oioJS— 1045b36), 
that is, "a principle of change in another or as other" (1046a 
10-1).(9) Motion can be viewed either as the actuality of a 
mover* s potentiality to move something, or even better as the 
actuality of something’s potentiality to be moved by a mover,
Thus, we appear to have little difficulty appreciating that 
motion is an energeia which correlates with the mere potentiality 
for such motion.
The other sort of energeia indicated in the passage is "as 
substance to some sort of matter" (1048b9). In order to follow 
Aristotle’s intention we must keep in mind that he presents an 
analogy. It is not solely substances which are energeiai 
standing over against the matter, but any being in any of the 
categories which is energeia as opposed to the substratum in the 
privative condition. For example, a white surface or the quality 
whiteness is the energeia in relation to the surface which is 
potentially white. Aristotle believes that energeia and dunamis 
cut across all the categories of being; there are actual and 
potential substances, qualities, quantities, relations, times, 
places, and so on. This is the very reason energeia resists 
definition but is grasped through analogy.
Something surprising emerges from the seemingly unprovocative 
observation that energeia and dunamis cut across all the cate­
gories. When we get to the categories of action (ttoi€?v ) and 
passion (ττάβρχςιν T, it appears that the actuality and potentiality 
of these are just the previous sorts of energeiai and dunameis 
(see Physics 202a22-4). When, for example, someone is actually 
building or the structure is in process of being built, then 
there is actual motion, whereas the potentialities to build or 
be built are the correlated potentialities. The actuality of an 
action or passion is most often motion, and the potentiality of 
either of these the dunamis which is the principle of this motion. 
Reflecting this way upon how energeia and dunamis pertain to the 
various categores of being helps us avoid too facilely thinking 
we can easily translate ’energeia’ in some contexts as actuality 
but in others as actualization or activity.(10) Sven motion, 
even becoming, can be viewed in some sense as being. Yet, though 
the analogy of energeia and dunamis spans the entirety of the 
categories of being, nonetheless we surely can distinguish 
becoming from being. Becoming is confined to the categories of 
action and passion that we have focused upon. All change, being 
according to Aristotle of four kindst change in substance, quality 
quantity, or place, is a process of becoming which terminates 
with a new being in one of the categories. The actuality of an . 
instance of the categories of action or passion, therefore, is 
a process toward another sort of being.(11)
The catégorial approach to energeia and dunamis which we 
especially found suggested by Arisioïïe * s use of analogy thus 
leads us to recognize that we locate the distinction of two types 
of energeiai— *’as movement to a potency" and "as substance to 
some sort of matter" (1048b8-9)— within the categories, the latter 
extending as widely as the categories themselves and the former 
being restricted to actions or passions. Somewhat crudely, we 
may say the latter are energeiai in relation to ’being* and the 
former energeiai in relation to ’becoming.’ That something like 
this path or thought stands behind Aristotle’s presentation in the 
main part of Metaphysics IX,6 seems confirmed by the final portion 
of the chapter which lays out the crucial distinction between
3energeiai and kineseis (ΙΟ^δ^Ιδ ff. ) . T ï j l s . abruptly., 
unless we allow that when Bristol;!©, starts off distinguishing two 
kinds of praxeis (in 1048bl8) that -praxis is here meant to refer 
to the whole category of action. (12) Then Aristotle is making a 
subtle distinction within this category. Though many actual 
actions are motions which terminate in a new actual category of 
being (for example, the action of building terminates in a house), 
still others do not seem analogously to be processes. For example, 
seeing, thinking, choosing, seem definitely to be instances of 
the category of action, along with building, hitting, heating, 
but unlike them not to be processes resulting in a being of 
another category. The thrust of Aristotle*s discussion of the 
distinction of energeia and kinesis is that though the energeiai 
resemble kineseis categorially, nevertheless they are different 
in a vital respect from them, thereby resembling the other sort 
of energeiai. We thus seem to have energeiai straddling the 
principal division between kinds of energeiai.
Let us trace what Aristotle says in the final section of 
Metaphysics IS.6 and then explore what he must be thinking. He 
indicates that some actions have' a limit (peras) toward which 
they proceed, not having their end ( teles). prior to reaching 
this limit, whereas others always have tiieir end in'themselves 
(1048bl8-23). It is in clarification of this point that 
Aristotle introduces the conjunction of present and perfect 
tenses. He gives examples of actions which we readily 
acknowledge we simultaneously do and have done, and other cases 
in which we must deny this. He states, "E.g. at the same time we 
are seeing and have seen, are understanding and have understood, 
are thinking and have thought (while it is not true that at the 
same time we are,learning and have learnt, or a being cured and 
have been cured.)** (1048b23-5). The fact that we can conjoin the 
perfect with the present in some cases means there is completeness 
throughout the duration of these actions and hence that their end 
is not an external limit toward which they head, but always 
within them.(13) It must be emphasized that Aristotle*s obvious 
purpose in referring to the conjunction of present and perfect 
tenses is to support the view that some actions are always 
complete, have their end, whereas others are not. Nothing he 
says suggests he is devising a criterion for identifying cases 
nor commenting upon peculiar features of the use of language.
Rather, his focus is exclusively upon the two kinds of actions 
under consideration.
The only further point made in this section is closely con­
nected and confirms the line I have taken. Aristotle says,
At the same time we are living well and have lived well, and 
are happy and have been happy. If not, the process would 
have had sometime to cease, as the process of making thin 
ceases: but, as things are, it does not ceasej we are living 
and have lived (1048b25-7).
The argument here is that if energeiai were not always having 
their end within them and being complete, then they would have 
to cease sometime as kineseis generally must.(14) Aristotle 
expects us to recognize that kineseis do cease when they reach 
their limit, whereas some sorts of actions, such as living well, 
never must thus cease, though of course they may cease sometime. 
Since it is not the case that these energeiai must ever necessarily 
stop at some determinate moment, they must always have their end 
in themselves and be complete. Unless these energeiai were always 
complete, they would be moving toward some limit reaching which 
they could not continue in the form they had had up .until, then.
Aristotle feels it adequate for his purposes in this chapter 
simply to leave it at emphasizing that energeiai have their end 
within them and are complete, whereas kineseis, having an external 
limit, are never complete so long as they remain kineseis, but 
only upon attaining their limit and ceasing the motion. Further 
clarity about Aristotle's thought depends upon our drawing 
inferences from the material he succinctly provides us here. Let 
us proceed to develop this comprehensive understanding of 
Aristotle*s contrast between energeiai and kineseis in order that 
we may grasp how to conceive the completeness of energeiai and 
hence overcome any confusion about them.
When we recall that Aristotle began in 1048bl8 by referring 
to actions (praxeis), we may realize that energeiai are
4restricted to a certain domain. When.we consider the examples 
he provides of energeiai, we find that that domain is rather 
narrow.(15) He often presents as energeiai cognitive activities, 
such as seeing, hearing, thinking, or more generally perception 
and intellection. He further illustrates energeiai with affective 
activities, such as enjoying, fearing, desiring. Finally, he 
looks toward the synthesis of ¡cognition and affectivity in choice 
(proairesis), action (praxis), living well, and being happy as 
another sort of energeia. We may hence conclude that energeiai 
extend only to the actions and passions of animals, and more 
precisely to their thought, perception, emotion, desire, or 
choice.(16)
Confirmation of this restriction of energeiai to the cog­
nitive and affective life of animals comes indirectly from a 
passage in a subsequent chapter. In the midst of showing the 
priority of actuality to potentiality in IX,8, Aristotle states, 
Where, then, the result is something apart from the exercise 
ton*' v), the actuality (evc/oygja) is in the thing that is 
being made, e.g. the act of building is in the thing that is 
being built and that of weaving in the thing that is being 
woven, and similarly in all other cases, and in general the 
movement (KÍvr\Cus ) is in the thing that is being moved; but 
where there is no product apart from the actuality
(ev^oy€1«^, the actuality (eve/ycra) is present in the agents, 
e.g. the act of seeing is in the seeing subject and that of 
theorizing in the theorizing subject and the life is in the 
soul (and therefore well-being also; for it is a certain kind 
of life). (1050a30-b2)
It is clear from this passage not only that the distinction 
between energeia and kinesis is based principally, as I have 
emphasized, upon whether the end is external or internal, but 
also that energeiai are all in the souls of animals, whereas 
kineseis may be in whatever is being moved by something. If 
energeiii were to be in what they were somehow effecting, then 
•fekey could not have their ends in themselves. Only certain 
psychical actions; of the cognitive, affective, and practical 
sorts we have been discussing, qualify as energeiai because with 
them the end is the very action "itself.
Once the true range of energeiai has been discerned diffi­
culties surrounding them disappear. Initially, we avoid concern 
about many verbs that seem to name energeiai when there is 
thought to be a linguistic criterion for them. If we just con­
sider the possibility of conjoining present and perfect tenses, 
then verbs suchas *being,* ’living,’ ’starting,’ ’stopping,’ and 
’walking' seem to name energeiai. But, having delimited the range 
of energeiai. we can generally dismiss these. 'Being* fails in 
many cases to be an action (praxis) at all and so is not in our 
sense an energeia, though it is perfectly proper to say, for 
example, ii is and has been green. 'Living' only names an 
energeia when we are speaking of animal life, the life of percep­
tion and intellection. Plants live, too, but do not have 
energeiai in our sense because their life is merely kinesis, such 
as growth and reproduction. ’Starting' or ’stopping,' when it is 
a kinesis that is doing so, could hardly be energeia. Finally, 
'walking, * whether we are thinking of walking without regard to 
an intended place or a walk to some definite place or aimless 
walking (if there is really ever such walking), could never be 
an energeia.
Any remaining uneasiness about Aristotle's distinction 
between energeia and kinesis can only be alleviated by further 
reflection upon what is entailed in giving energeiai this narrow 
range. The outstanding obstacles for Aristotle’s distinction 
are these two. First, kineseis, when we ignore their ends, seem 
complete throughout the course of their duration. For example, 
at any moment once we have started to move it seems true to say 
we have moved, even though we have not reached our ultimate 
destination. Thus it might appear that motions could have their 
ends within themselves. Second, when an energeia has for its 
object not something instantaneous, such as a small color patch 
or a single note, but an object having temporal duration and even 
a kinesis, such as a musical performance or a horse race, then it 
seems no more complete at every moment than its object. Hence an 
energeia might have its end outside itself. Let us see if we can
5remove these obstacles by showing how energeiai, as psychical, 
activities, have a relationship with ..their 'ends ...different from 
those which kineseis have with their ends.
With regard to the first matter, the completeness of kineseis 
when we consider them apart from their ends, we may exhibit how 
different this is from the completeness of an energeia. Every 
kinesis is a process through time in which we achieve more and 
more of the end until the process arrives at completion. Until 
the end is attained there are merely partial realizations. This 
is stated well in Nicomachean Ethics X,4.ir74al9-23.
For every movement (kinesi s ) (, e.gT that of building) takes time 
and is for the sake of an end, and is complete when it has 
made what it aims at. It is complete, therefore, only in the 
whole time or at that final moment. In their parts and during 
the time they occupy, all movements are incomplete, and are 
different in kind from the whole movement and from each other. 
Since kineseis are thus not truly complete except "in the whole 
time or at tiiät final moment," if we speak of them in the perfect 
tense while they are still in process it must be merely retro­
spectively. When we claim, after we start moving, that we have 
moved, this only means we have accomplished some parts of our 
process of moving. For example, during the course of a long 
walk or a project of building we have already walked or built 
so far or so much as we have walked or built. But when we use 
the perfect tense in the case of energeiai, psychical activities, 
we are not using it retrospectively ox those parts of the activi­
ties which have already been accomplished. Energeiai. not being 
processes which take time or which could ever be merely partially 
realized, always have the ends in themselves and are always com­
plete. The perfect tense, in their case, has no reference to the 
past, it rather refers to the completeness in this very moment 
of the energeia.(17) Since energeiai are wholly complete in 
every momenx and never only partially complete, at the very first 
instant of their onset it would be proper to use the perfect 
tense, whereas with kineseis the perfect might only be used some 
time after they begin. |lö)·
Having thus removed the obstacle about kineseis considered 
apart from their ends by showing their deficient mode of com­
pleteness, we must now examine the effects on energeiai of having 
objects with temporal durations. How, when their, objects are in 
motion or taking time, could energeiai be complete at every 
moment? Aristotle is evidently unperturbed by the possibility of 
energeiai with temporally extended objects. He states in 
McomacHian Ethics X.4«1174al4-9.
Seeing seems to be at any moment complete, for it does not lack 
anything which coming into being later will complete its form; 
and pleasure also seems to be of this nature. For it is a 
whole, and at no time can one find a pleasure whose form will 
be completed if the pleasure lasts longer.
Why Aristotle is so confident about energeiai being complete at 
every moment is that he attributes to them the sort of indivisi­
bility and simplicity of a mathematical point or unit. He 
declares in Nicomachean Ethics 1174b9-14,
From these considerations it is clear, too, that these thinkers 
are not right in saying there is a movement or a coming into 
being of pleasure. For these cannot be ascribed to all things, 
but only to those that are divisible and not wholes; there is 
no coming into being of seeing nor of a point nor of a unit, 
nor is any of these a movement or coming into being; therefore 
there is no movement or coming into being of pleasure either; 
for- it is a whole, (19)
We need to examine how energeiai are complete in form at every 
moment and have no coming into being due to their being as 
indivisible as points or units.
In Metaphysics VII,8 it is argued that in a process of change 
neither the form nor the matter comes to be, but only the com­
posite of form and matter has genesis. In particular, the form 
cannot come to be since where there is no divisibility there can 
be no coming into being (1033bll-9). Now Aristotle has indicated 
quite clearly that he believes energeiai are as indivisible and 
complete as units or points and so not involved in any becoming. ( 20) 
The foundation of this belief lies in his understanding of cogni­
tion. If every energeia is either cognition or closely connected 
with it, as we have emphasized, and each cognitive act, whether
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and "non-modal" senses of energeia and dunamis, in "Different 
Meanings of the Term Energeia in the Philosophy of Aristotle," 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 17(1956-7), 56-65. He 
says moving or functioning is a non-modal sense of energeia, 
translatable as 'actualization' or 'actualizing,* whereas cases
in which we speak of actuality versus potentiality are quasi- 
modal, since these are "ways of existence" (Chen, p. 57, refers 
to 1048a30-2). See on this L.A. Kosman, "Aristotle's Definition 
of Motion," Phronesis 14(19691. 40-62.
(11) My catégorial approach toward energeia and dunamis seems confirmed 
by Meta. 1048b9-17 and such a passage as: "Further, matter exists 
in a potential state, just because it may come to its form; and 
when it exists actually, then it is in its form. And the same 
holds good in all cases, even those in which the end is a move­
ment (1050al5-7, my italics)."
(12) A difficulty might be raised about whether Aristotle would speak
of non-animals as engaged in praxeis. Though he normally would not,
I believe we must here allow a broad sense to the term. W.D. Ross 
suggests, is first used in a general sense=Kivr\giy, then in
its stricter sense of Kivr\<nj· τ€λ€»« (p. 253, n. 1048bl8-2l)."
8(13; Aristotle does not. here quite say that energeiai always have -their 
ends, and hence Ackrill has toyed with the possibility that he does 
not mean the present always to "entail the perfect” (pp. 123 ff. ). 
The context, however, makes it clear we may add the "always." We 
should note the of*v in 1048b28 suggests we are considering actions 
throughout their duration. I return to this point below.
(14) Locomotion in a circle is the only exception.
(15) Only Mamo seems to have noted the extent of energeiai; he says, "It 
is not, of course, accidental that all the energeiaimentioned by 
Aristotle are mental processes (p. 32)." Mamo does not push this 
point as far as he might have.
(16) That energeiai must link up with perceptive and intellective life 
makes it fitting, as we previously noted, that they straddle the 
main division of energeiai into those pertaining to ’becoming* and 
those to ’being.* Since cognition is by ’like to like’ and it 
must apprehend all things, it should be like or become like to all.
(17) Ackrill misunderstands the present perfect tense. He suggests, 
"the ’has heard* can be taken to refer to a period of time pre­
ceding the moment to which the ’hears* refers (p. 126)." This is 
to confuse ’has been hearing* with ’has heard.’ In the case of 
energeiai. the perfect tense conjoined with the present refers to 
the completeness in this present moment, but not to a stretch of 
activity prior to the present, as it does with kineseis. Ryle had 
a better sense of this than Ackrill. I am indebted here to a 
paper by Thomas Bartlett.
(18) This point underlies Nie. Ethics 1174al4-9 and b3-9.
(19) This likening of cognitive activity to a unit or point is not 
unique in the corpus. See De Anima 427al0-3 and De Sensu 449316-20.
(20) In De Sensu VI.446b2-4, Aristotle says, "acts of sense-perception 
do not involve a process of becoming, but have their being none 
the less without involving such a process."
(21) For an illuminating discussion of this doctrine, see Joseph Owens* 
"Form and Cognition in Aristotle," Ancient Philosophy 1(1980), 17-27.·
(22) This may be taken to be the central meaning of the difficult pas­
sage De Anima III,6,430bl4-20. The view that psychical energeiai 
are directed to the whole matter for thought credits all animals 
wj,th some of the ability Xenophanes claimed for god when he said? 
©ύλο$ oya«, oSAoi Sè voeî , oùXÔS &€ t^kouci (Fr. 24).
